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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TRADE CO~IMISSION OF UTAH,
RTA '11 E O:F1 UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appell ant,
-\"S.-

SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC.,
GHAND CENTRAL STORES,
TNC., d/h/a 'WARSHAW'S
GTANT FOOD and GRAND
CE1\'11 RAL DRUGS, INC.

\

Case
No.11034

l'TAH In~T,\JL GROCJ£RS'
1\SSOClA'l'l(>l\
l11ter1'enor-Appellwnt.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT,
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC.
NATURE 01'"' THE CASE
This is an action ini:ititutcd by the Utah Trade Commissio11 to 011join each of the defendant-respondents
from selling certnin merchandise in violation of the
1'tali Unfair Practices Act (13-5-7, 13-5-9, Utah Code
Annotntc(l 1933, as amended). The Utah Retail Groc·Prs' "\ ssocia tion was permitted to intervene in the
<1dio11.
1

DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT
The case was tried to the lower court without a
jury. Based upon the stipulations of the parties and
the evidence adduced a,t trial, the court entered judgment in favor of defendants, and held the Unfair Practices Act to be unconstitutional as being in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, and in violation of the Constitution of
the State of Utah, Article I, Sections 1, 2, 7, 18, 23 and
24, Article VI, Section 26, and Article XII, Section 20.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent, Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc.,
seeks affirmance of the judgment of the lower court and
a declaration by the Supreme Court that the Utah
Unfair Practices Act is unconstitutional.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are those as set forth by the
lower court in its findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. (hereinafter called
"Skaggs") and Grand Central Stores, Inc., dba Warshaw 's Giant Food and Grand Central Drugs, Inc.
(hereiuafter called "Grand Central") are retail merchants, who offer for sale a wide variety of merchandise,
each item of which has individual cost factors such as
variai1ce in consumer demand for the product, rate of
turnover, cost of aclvertising, harnlling coshi, includiug

warehousing, marketing, packaging, displaying and purchasing costs, varying depreciation sometimes depending on perishability or seasonal demand and sometimes
depending on obs<)lescence, labor, overhead and administra.tin1 costs and trade and cash discounts some of
which cannot be determined or are not known at the
time the goods are priced for sale. Defendants, each
using separate ::i.ccounting methods, for the purpose of
determining proper profit and cost guidelines for their
operations, are each using sound, accepted and practical
accounting procedures with as much emphasis of detail
as ft>asible. Neither defendant attempts to accurately
<1etermine their cost for each item they sell, as to do so
would be too costly and hence impractical and not f easihlc. Defendants cannot reasonably be required to estahlish accounting procedures whereby their actual cost
per item sold could be determined at or prior to the sale
or offering for sale of such item. (R. 42)
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that on June 23, 1966,
(1efem1ants advertised ''Crest Family Toothpaste'' at
50¢, which is a sale below cost as defined by the Utah
Unfair Pradices Act, with the intent and purpose of
inducing the purchase of other merchandise or unfairly
diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring
a competitor. Since the only defense offered by the
(1dcndants to this charge was the unconstitutionality of
tli<:' act, these allegations were taken to be true. (R. 37)
On .Tune 23, 1966, the defendant, Grand Central,
ad,·ertised and sold "Aqua Net Hair Spray" at 49¢,
\\·hich was a sale below cost as defined in the act. On the
3

same date, Skaggs advertised and sold "Style Hair
Spray" at 49¢, which was a sale below cost as ddinerl
by the act. "Aqua Net Hair Spray'' and "Style Hair
Spray" are competitive and comparable products "·ith
regard to weight, size, use, price and customer demand.
The sales by Skaggs and Grand Central were made in
an endeavor to meet the price of Shoppers' Discount, a
competitor of defendants, which had advertised and sold
"Aqua Net Hair Spray" at 49¢ on June Hi, 1966. The
sale by Shoppers' Discount was also a sale he low cost as
defined by the act. Neither defendant has any actual
knowledge that the sale hy Shoppers' Discom1t was a
sale below cost as defined by the act. ( R. 39) rrhe court
concluded that the sales by Grand Central and Skaggs
were made by defendants in an Pndeavor macle in goon
faith to meet the price of their competitor selling the
same article, product or eommoclity, and that ch-fondants were entitled to assume that the ad\·ertised price of
Shoppers' Disconut was a lt'gal pricP in the al1sv11ce of
actual knowledge of au illegal sale by Shoppers' Di~
count. (R. 46)
On June 20, 1966, Skaggs aclYPrtised a carton of
eigarettes for $2.73 and gave a <'igarette lighter nwa_\·,
free, v>'ith the purchase of each <'arton, which eigaretk
lighter cost Skaggs 25¢ each. The sale of the carton of
cigarettes alone was not a sale below cost as defined h;·
the act unless the cost of the cigarettes and 1igl1ter
,,·ere comhinetl, in "·hich cast• the sale would be a sale
helow cost as defined hy the ad. ( R. :1!)) 'l'he C'Omt co11cludecl that the tra 11saetion in q nest ion did not Yiola t e
the act since the sale of tlw cig-an•tt(•s wa" not a sale lii>4

low cost as defined by the act and the gift of the lighter
,,·as not prohihitC><l by the act. (R. 46)
Ou .TUM 16, J 966, Skagg·s advertised m the Provo
Daily Herald th0 sale of Vimanal Vitamins at 82¢ per
hmHl rPd tablets, which was a sale he low cost as defined
l1y the act. Skaggs had no competitor in the Pro,To area
\\'ith respect to this item. Thr sale was made by Skaggs
,,·ith the intent of inducing its cnstomers to purchasr
other rnerrhandisC>, bnt \Yas not do1i0 with the purpose of
unfairly divertini.;· trade from a compl'titor or other"·isc injuring a eompetitor. (R. ;:rn, 40) The court con(']rn le'( l tlH• pro hi hi ti on against thr sale below cost was
llllC'Ollf<titutional whe1·e the only intent of the retailer in
pricing tht> item helow cost was to induce the customer
of the retailer to purchase other merchandise from that
retailer. (H. 44, 45)

011 .Tnne 23, 1%6, the deft-ndants advertised "Bayer
Aspiri11 '' nt ;'};)¢ per lmudre<l. The sale of "Bayer Aspiri11'' at ~);)ef: h:· Gn111d Central was not a sale below cost as
<1cfiiw<1 b:· the act, bnt the sale by Skaggs was a sale below cost as defi110d hv the act, dnc to the different disromits given to the two defendants in connection with
tlwir purchase of the item. (R. 24, 25, 40)
Ou .Tune 20, 1906, Skaggs advertised "Polaroid
8wing·er Came ms'' at $13.49, which was a sale below
<'ost as defined in the act, and in connec,tion with the
snl0 limit0d one camera to a customer. Section 13-5-9
(2) cr0atcs a prpsumption that a sale was made with the
i ut t'll t of injuring competitors or destroying compe5

tition where a salf' is ma<le below cost as defined in the
act and there is a limitation on the quantity which ean
be sold to any one customer. Except for this statutory
presumption, there was insufficient evidence that Skaggs
offered the camern for sale with the intent of inducing
the purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise injuring a
competitor. The court concluded that the statutory presumption of illegal intent unconstitutionally shifted the
burden of proof to the defendant and arbitrarily assumes
an illegal intent from unrelated facts.
ARGUMENT
Defendant, Skaggs, agrees substantially with the
general statements of appellant and intervenor-appellant, concerning the role of a court in passing on the con
stitutionality of a statute, fo the effect that a court will,
if possible, adopt a construction of a statute which will
uphold its constitutionality. It should also be pointed
out, however, tha,t a statute is either constitutional or unconstitutional by reason of its scope, purpose and effect
and is to be tested by realistic consideration of the subject which it encompasses, the purpose which it seeks to
serve and the effect it has when put into operation. Accordingly, a court will not amend a statute by construction i1~ order to make it constitutional. Scales Y.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. FJd. 2d 782, SJ S. Ct.
1469; State ex rel Edwards v. Osbourne, 195 S. C. 295,
11 S.E. 2d 260 (1940).

It should also h<-' pointecl out that the statute in question here is a criminal statute which may subject a party
co11\'ictecl of its violation to both a fine and imprisonment.
Tlw courts will carefully scrutinize any such statute when
attacked on the grounds that the statute is vague and
ambiguous or where it fringes upon a basic constitutional
ri,\d1t. As stated by Justice Crockett in the case of State
\'.Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952), even where
a statute is enacted for a proper purpose "great caution
must lw ohserved i11 permitting encroachments upon basic
rights, assured by the constitution, and such restrictions
can he effectecl 011ly in accordance with constitutional
prerogatin's a11d where clearly expressed standards are
set up .... where ::i rule is set up, the violation of which
suhjects one to criminal punishment, the restrictions
upon eornhwt should he described with sufficient certainty,
Ro that persons with ordinary intelligence, desiring to
obey the la,v, may know how to govern themselves in
c011formit~· with it, and that no one should be compelled
at the p0ril of life, liberty or property, to speculate as
to the meaning of penal statutes." (See also City of Price
,.. Jaynes, lB Utah 89, 191P.2d606 (1948); State v.11!11sser, 118 Ftah 337, 22:3 P.2d 193 (1950); U.8. v. L. Kohen
Orocery Co., 235 lT.S. 81, 41 S. Ct. 298, 65 L. Ed. 516.
Numerous cases from other jurisdictions, both sustaining nucl deelaring unconstitutional the Unfair Practices Ads of other states are annotated in 118 A.L.R.
:>OG and 128 A.L.R. 1126. No hard, fast rules can be deifretl from the conflicting d0cisions of other courts concerning tlH' constitutionalit>' of this type of statute. Much
(1f the conflict is due to the fact that the statutes them-
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selws vary widely in regard to what is prohibited, the
presumptions created, the uniformity of the applicatio 11
of the statutes in question, etc. An examination of the
cases can, however,, illustrate why some courts han'
struck down the Unfair Practices Acts of their own state 8
and provisions which Unfair Practices Acts mm;t or
must not contain in order to avoid vulnerability to co11stitutional attack. The Utah Legislature can he credited
with incorporating into the Utah Act most of the proYisions which have caused courts of other jurisdictions to
declare the acts of their states uncoustitutional.
POINT I.
THE ACT rs UNCONsrrrTUTIONAL AS BEING
AN ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE
IGXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
Since the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in the case of Ncbbia v. Neu.· York, 291 U.S. 302, :J.J:
S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934) it has gemTally beeu
held that Unfair Practices Acts are within the domaiu
of the state's police power and can be enacted by state
legislatures. Such acts, however, nn' uucoustitntional if
''arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelenrnt
to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and henl'e
an unnecessary and unwarrauted interference with individual l~berty.'' The Supreme Court in the N ebbia
case held that the right of state legislatures to enact such
legislation is conditioned by the clue process clause and
that the Fourteeuth .A mernlment reqnirl's "that the end
shall be accomplished hy methods consistent with dnr
process.'' The guarantee of due process demands ''that
8

the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious
an<l. that the mean selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained."
The Utah Act runs afoul of this basic requirement.
Utah's Unfair Practices Act as it existed prior to
1965, provided in part:
13-5-7. Sales, less than cost. - (a) It is hereby declared that any advertising, offer to sell or
sale of any merchandise, either by retailers or
wholesalers, a,t less than cost as defined in this
act with the intent and purpose of inducing the
purchase of other merchandise or of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise inj nriug a competitor, impairs and prevents fair
competition, injures public welfare, is unfair
('ompetition contrary to public policy and the polic:· of this act and is declared to be a violation of
this act, where the result of such advertising,
offer or sale is to tend to deceive any purchaser
or prosperti,,e purchaser, or to substantially les~en competition, or to unreasonably restrain trade,
or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.''
In 1965, the statute was amended so as to delete
the clause, "where the result of such advertising, offer,
or sale is to tend to deceive any purchaser or prospective
purchaser, or to substantially lessen competition, or to
unreasonably restrain trade, or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.'' As the statute now
reads, it is a violation of the act to make a sale below cost
ns clefinc>d hy the act regardless of whether or not any
pu hlic injury results if the sale is made with the intent
"of inducing the purchase of other merchandise or of
9

unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or otherwise
injuring a competitor."
Most courts which have considered the question have
held that in order for the statute to be constitutional it
must only prohibit sales below cost which are made with
an evil intent, or \vhich accomplish an evil result. E. g.
Kansas ''· Fleming Co., 184 Kansas 674, 339 P.2d 12
(1959); Englebrecht v. Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208 P.2d 538
( 1949). As stated by the Colorado Supreme Court in the
case of Perkins v. King Soopers, Inc., 122 Colo. 263, 221
P.2d 343 (1950):
Our study of the decided cases leads to the conclusion that a statute attempting to prohibit all
sales below cost would be unconstitutional, and
to avoid this result only such sales may be prohibited which are intended to injure the public
in a manner warranting the exercise of the police
power.
The Utah Act as it presently exists can subject a
defendant to criminal punishment for making a sale with
the sole purpose of inducing a customer to purchase othrr
merchandise, a1thcugh such act neither misleads a purehaser, injures a competitor, tends to create a monopoly, restrains trade or lessens competition, and although
the seller intended none of these results. There is no requirement i!1 the Utah Statute for the existence of an
intent to injure the public in :my manner and no such
result need he accomplished in order to make the seller
guilty. At least this is the contention of appellant in
charging the defendant Skaggs i11 Count V of the complaint with a Yiolation for 1'elli11g a brand of ,·itamins
10

below cost where it was stipulated that no competitor of
Skaggs had such vitamins available for sale. Skaggs admits that it priced the vitamins below invoice cost plus
the statutory 6% markup in hopes that purchasers might
lm:v other merchandise in addition to vitamins when they
eame into the store. The court below properly held such
a prohibition to be unconstitutional. Such a prohibition
against something which is not in itself evil, does not
tend tmrnrd something evil and which is not done with an
evil purpose is beyond the authority of the Legislature
and is unconstitutional. Pennsylvania's Supreme Court in
striking down the Unfair Practices Act of that state for
the statute's failure to provide an illegal intent stated
in Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67, 70;
(1940) :
Price cutting in itself is not an evil; on the
contrary, the more intense the competition, the
greater the likely advantage to the purchasing
public. Indeed there is no reason why a merchant
should not make an absolute gift of merchandise
to his customers if he desires to be benevolent or
therebv advertise his business. There are many
other ·coneeiva ble and wholly proper reasons
whieh might induce him to make sales without
profit, as, for example, a necessity of paying importunate ereditors. It is only when the object
of price cutting is sinister - to destroy a comjetitor by suffering· a temporary loss in order ~o
gain an ultimate monopoly (Mogle 's Steamship
Co., Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Company, 23 Q. B.
598), or to defraud the public by seducing ~hem
into the purchase of other goods at an exorbitant
price - that the selling of ?oods at ~ess t~an cost
may constitute an econonnc or social evil. The
Pe1~nsylvania Act, therefore, is arbitrary, and the
11

means which it employs are grossly out of proportion to the object which it seeks to attain.
In order for a statute to constitutionally restrict a
person's right to advertise and sell his goods, a danger
to the public heaHh, welfare or morals must exist and
the statute must have a substantial a11d reasonable relationship to the correction or elimination of that danger.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Pride Oil Company v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2nd 183, 370 P.2d :ri5
(1962) stated that one of the basic tenets of our system is
that free and open competition is a wholesome, stimulating force in our economy. The court in striking down
a statute "'hich restricted service stations in advertisillg
the price of gasoline, stated :
The attack upon the statutes is based upon the
ground that they are an invasion of the right to
o-wn and enjoy property. We have recognized that
this includes the right to sell it; and to let others
know of the desire, to do so and the price.
The validity of appellant's contention that
these rights are not absolute is acknowledged. One
who desires to assert them and have them enforced by public authority must do so in an awareness that when in the judgment of the legislature
it appears to be necessary for the protection of
some more important interest of the public which
involves safeguarding its health, morals, safety
or welfare, even those basic personal rights may
be limited to the extent necessary to so protect
the public interest.
But a pivotal consideration in the problem bl'fore us is that in order to justify encroachment on
these rights, such a <lnng-er to the public mnst
exist and the statute must he sueh that it will luwc
some substantial arnl rea,.;onable relationship to
the elimination or correctio11 of the <'\-ii.
12

The Utah Unfair Practices Act makes it a crime for
a merchant to sell his merchandise for a sum below that
which is defined as cost by the act, regardless of whether
such sale misleads a purchaser, injures a competitor or
restrains trade and regardless of whether the seller intended any of these results. It is difficult to see how this
act comes within the purview of constitutionality permissible legislation as laid down hv this court in the Pride
Oil Company case.
POINT II
THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AND
AMBIGUOUS
An Unfair Practices Act which pro Yid es criminal
sanctions for its violation must not be vague or ambiguous in order to avoid offending the due process clauses
of both the federal and state constitutions. E.g. State v.
Tr al green Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308, 113 P.2d 650 (1941);
Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy and Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A.2d 201 (1940); Avella v. Almac's, Inc., (R. I. 1965), 211 A.2d 665; State v. Wender,
149 v\T. Va., 413, 141S.E.2d 359 (1965). As stated by the
Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Packard,
Supra:
The limitations of language are such that
neither absolute exactitude of expression nor complete preci8ion of meaning are to be expected, and
such standard cannot he required. On the other
hand there is no disagreement among the courts
that where a rule is set up, the violation of which
subjects one to criminal punishment, the restric-
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--tions upon conduct should be described "-ith sufficient certainty, so that persons of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know how
to govern themselYes in conforming with it, and
that no one should he compelled at the peril of
life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes ....
Concerning the question of uncertainty or
vagueness of statutes the auhoritY seemed to he
in accord that the test of statute ~ust meet to be
valid is: It must be sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordinary intelligence, who would
be law abiding, what their conduct must be to
conform to its requirements; (h) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just what constitutes the offense with which he is charged; and
( c) to be susceptible of uniform interpret a ti on and
application by those charged with responsibility
of applying and enforcing it.
See also Co~nnally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S.
385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926); City of Price v.
Jaynes, 113 Utah 89, 191 P.2d 606 (1948); State v. .1!11sser, Supra; Musser v. State, 333 U.S. 95, 68 S. Ct. 397.
92 L. Ed. 562 (1948).
The cost below which a retailer may not sell his
goods is defined by the act in Section 13-5-7 ( h) 3, as
follows:
3. When used in this act, the term ''cost to
the retaileT shall mean the invoice cost of the
merchandise to the retailer within 30 days prior
to the date of sale, or the date of offering for sale,
or the replacement cost of tlw m0rchandise to t'.1L'
retailer, whichever is lower; ]pss all trade discounts except eustomar~- <lisconnts for cash; to
which shall be a<lded: (a) frPiglit charges not otlt14

c>rwise included in the i1ffoice cost or the replacement co8t of the merchandise as herein set forth
and (h) cart ago to the retail outlet if done or paid
for by the retailer, which cartage cost in the absence of proof of a lesser cost, shall be deemed to
he %ths of 1 % of the cost to the retailer as herein
defined after adding thereto freight charges but
before adding thereto cartage and mark-up, and
a mark-up to coyer a proportionate part of the
cost of tloing business, which mark-up in the ab:-:Pnce of proof of a lesser cost, shall be 6% of the
cost to the retailer as herein set forth after adding
thereto freight charges and cartage but before
adding thereto a mark-up."
Tlw act ostensibly gi\·es to the merchant the right
to sell his goods for the i1ffoice price of the goods, less
all trade discounts except "customary discounts for
cash" plus freight charges plus "a proportionate part of
the cost of doing business.'' The act condemned by the
comt in the case of Bal.zer , .. Caler, 74 P.2d 839 (Cal.
A pp. l!"tH), affirmed 82 P.2d rn, also contained a proYision pro\·itling that the retailer, in order to amid violation of the statute, must add to the cost of his goods, "a
mark-up to cover a proportionate part of the cost of
doing lmsiness." The problems which a retailer faces
in ('omplying with this statute was pointed out by the
court in the Balzer case as follows:
According to the language of the statute, the
aggregate of all these rnrious items must be added to the im·oice or replacement costs of a particular artiek which the vendor desires to sell to
determi11e the price helow which he is precluded
from disposing of the goods. A bare statement
of the asserted rules demonstrates this absurdity.
It is not the proportion of the overhead expenses
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which the value of the article for sale bears to the
value of the entire stock of goous which is to he
added to the invoice price of the article, but all
cost incurred in the conduct of such business are
to be added thereto. Moreover, the statute fails
to state what period of time is to be included in
estimating overhead expenses which are to he
added to the invoice price of the article to lw sold
so as to determine the cost for resale thereof. A
merchant's stock in trade varies from time to
time. Meats, bakery products and certain classes
of groceries deteriorate rapidly. Is the mer·
chant to take stock and hold an accounting every
time he wishes to display for sale a few leader
articles below normal price for the purpose of advertisement V For the purpose of such sales is
he to estimate his average overhead expense for
the period of the year, or for a month, or is he to
ascertain that sum on the very day on which hr
proposes to sell the forbidden article? By what
standards is a merchant to determine such elements as depreciation of the goods, selling cost, or
credit losses? What is to be the measure of the
value of his equipment? Is there to he no limit of
expenditures for interest, insurance, or achertising? The statute throws no light upon thesr perplexing problems. EvNy merchant is left to gt1t·s~
the rules and standards to he appliccl and to drtermine for himself the period for which the
overhead expenses are to he cakulated. The section is therefore uncertain and inrnlicl in that
regard.
In this case, Skaggs was found by the court to have
sold "Bayer Aspirin" at a price in excess of the invoice
cost of the aspirin but he low "cost" as clefined hy tl1P
:.1ct. In order to uvoicl violating the law, Skaggs \rnnl<l
be required to add to each bottle of aspirin sold a propor-
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tionate cost of doing business. How would the cost of
rental, depreciation, real estate taxes, be applied to the
sales price of a bottle of ''Bayer Aspirin''? Should the
bottle of apsirin be required to bear its proportionate
sl1are of these costs based upon the percentage of space
\Yhich the bottle occupies in the store~ Should this resulting figure then be modified so as to take into account
the length of time the boHle occupied that space as comparecl with the average length of time which other items
in the store occupied space? What about the cost of fire
insurance premiums? Is the bottle of "Bayer Aspirin"
to bear the same proportionate cost of these premiums as
are more flammable materials? What proportion of the
salaries of the employees of the store are to be attributed
to the bottle of "Bayer Aspirin"? Would it be based
npon the amount of time it takes a checker to sell a bottle
of aspirin to a customer? If so, how is the average length
of time it takes a checker to sell a bottle of "Bayer Aspirin" to be determined? All of the above questions must
be answered by the retailer before he can attribute to a
particular item its proportionate part of the cost of doing
business. It is questionable that this statute "informs
persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be law abidiHg, what their conduct must be to conform to its requirements." A retailer's only alternative is to add to the
invoice cost of the goods a 6% ma,rk-up. Such an alternative was given to the defendant in the case of State v.
lV ender, Supra. The statute in this case referred to "oost
of doing business,'' and the court in holding the act to
lw unconstitutional found this phrase incomprehensible.
Since the retailer could not comply with it, he was re-
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quired to rely on the regulati011s imposed by the statute.
This was held to be no alternative.
In actual practice the modern retailer may not know
what the actual price of his goods are to which he is
required to add the 6%, until long after the sale of that
item has taken place. 'l'he testimony of ~fr. Edwin N.
Austin, Jr., in this case concerning this matter is as
follows:
Q. There are however other discounts that are
unknown at the time the goods are received in the
store, isn't that correct?

A. Yes.
Q. Would you describe some of these discounts
that you are familiar with?

A. vVell, you have some products that you buy
over a period of time, you receive free goods, depending upon the quantity as you buy. These are
in items and categories that you have 110 k11owledge of what those free goods would he. ·when you
receive them it is almost like a gift. You don't
know how much you have earned, or how much
you have coming until they rome around in the
quota, and send you these free gifts. I am talki11~
about like items or appliances at the end of a
quota or any gi\'en period, they will send yon
some free goods to rebate you for, perhaps on•r
this period. There arc other items you get a rebate on ·volume, depending upon "'hat your \'Olume is, and this rebate increases as your volume
goes up, and it could vary, as au example fro.rn
5% to 101/c, depeuding on where the level will
he when vou fo1ish the i-;c>n.so11. [am talking a.bout
an item iike garden hose. You have> 110 idea how
much garden host.' you arc> going to sell in a gin-11
season, but as you rc>ach these differc>nt l<-'\'els you
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get ~ifferent rebates and you have no way of
knowmg what these ·will be. So we never enter
these on our cost ·when we ar<:> cost marking our
merchandise. (R. 90-91)
The definition of the price below ·which a seller may
not sell his merchandise without violating the acit is furth<:>r complicated by the fact that the merchant is to deduct from his invoice cost ''all trade discounts except
eusfoma ry discounts for cash." Now here in the act is
there a definition as to what is meant by "cmitomary discounts for cash.'' It evidently does not apply to all cash
diseounts since only "customary cash discounts" are to
be subtracted frow the trade discounts which reduce the
im'entor~' price. Customary to whom? A cash discount
\\'hich is customarily given to this particular merchant,
or a discount which is customarily ginn in the trade,
whether or not this particular merchant ordinarily receives such a discount? The merchant must interpret the
statute for himself and arrive at its meaning at his peril.
The clefini ti on of cost as contained in the Unfair Practic0s Ae,t is too vague and ambiguous to apprise a party
as to what he may or may not do without violating the

art.
The ambiguity in the clefini ti on of "cost" is only
one of the ambiguities which permeates the act. The act
prohihi,ts certain sales done "with the intent and purpose of inducing the purchase of other merchandise, or
of unfairly diverting trade from a competitor or other1l'ise injuring a conipctitor." The act nowhere indicates
what is meant by "unfairly diverting trade from a compc>titor. '' If a merchant adnrtises goods below cost in
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order to reduce his inventory as was done in connection
with the charge set forth in Counts VII and VIII of the
complaint, is this unfairly diverting trade from a competitod If he sells an item below cost in order to introduce people to a new store, as was done in connection with
the charge set forth in Count VI of the complaint, is this
unfairly diverting trade from a competitor? The merchant
must guess as to when he is "unfairly" as distinguished
from fairly diverting trade from a competitor. His guesses are at his peril since there are no guidelines whatsoever in the statute as to what might constitute an unfair
diversion of trade from a competitor. If he fairly diverts trade from a competitor but that competitor is
thereby injured by the loss of business, has he "otherwise injured a competitor" so as to be in violation of the
acO In Musser v. State, supra, the phrase, "to commit
any act injurious ... to public morals'' was held to be
unconstitutional for vagueness. In State v. Packard,
supra, this court held the term "nationally recognized
union'' was held too vague and indefinite to meet constitutional standards. If the above terms are too vague and
indefinite it is difficult to Ree how phrases like "unfairly
diverting trade frcm a competitor" or "otherwise injuring a competitor'' can stand the constitutional test of informing a party what he may or may not do.
The act is al130 vague and ambiguous insofar as Section 13-5-12 ( d) of the act is concerned. This section
exempts from the prohibitions of the act sales made:
( d) In an endeavor madr in gool1 faith to
meet the legal prices of a eom1wtitor as herein
defined selling the same article, product, or commodity in the same locality or tralle area.
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To begin with the "legal prices of a competitor" are
nowhere defined in the act. But assuming that such definition were given, this provision would still be too ambiguous to apprise the Reller of what he could or what
h& could iwt do. An identical provision of the New Jersey Unfair Practices Act was struck down in the case
of State v. Packard-Bamberger & Company, 123 N.J. 180,
8 A.2d 291 ( 1939). The court stated:
How a person is to determine the legality of
the price of a competitor is not declared, and the
impracticality, if not impossibility, of determining the "legality" of a competitor's price is
obvious.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in striking down
the Pennsylvania Unfair Practices Act on the grounds
that it was so vague, indefinite and incapable of practical application as to make its enforcement a violation of
due process stated in the case of Commonwealth v.
Zasloff, supra, "how could a merchant know whether a
selling price which he proposed to fix was legal because
it met the 'legal price of a competitor for merchandise of
the same grade, quantity and quality?' How could such
a legal price of a competitor be ascertained without examining the competitor's books in order to determine
whether his price was legal 1''
Furthermore, the exemption applies only to sales
to meet a competitor "in the same locality or trade
area.'' Is a small grocery store on the avenues in the
same "locality or trade area" as a large grocery on 39th
South~ Is Skaggs' store in Bountiful "in the same loeality or trade area" as Grand Central's store on 9th
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South in Salt Lake City? In the case of State v. Sta11darrl
Oil Co. of New Jersey, 195 So. Car. 267, 10 S.E.2d 778
(1940) the court condemned tlw use of the words "locality", "community'', "section", "section of a locality" as
used in a statute prohibiting locality price discrimination.
POINT III
THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN ITS UNJUSTIFIABLE
DISCRIMINATION BETvVEEN PARTIES
SIMILARLY SITUAT:BJD
A statute which differe11tiates between different
classes without a reasonable basis for the differentiation,
or which has the effect of gi,·ing different treatment to
persons similarly situated is uncoustitutional. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State Y.
Packard, supra:
Statutes may deal different classes differently,
if all within the same class are treated uniformly,
and so 101w as there is some reasonable basis for
"'
differentiation
between classes related to the purpose of the statute. State Y. }[ason, 94 Utah 501,
78 P. 2d 920, 117 A.L.R. 330; State Y. J. V. & R. E.
\Va1ker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P. 2cl 766. Conversely, a statute is unconstitutional as being unreasonably discriminatory if it differentiates between sudh classes witho~1t am· reasonable basis
bearing on the purpose sought
be accomplished
by the statute. Gronlund Y. Salt Lake City, 113
Utah 284, l 94 P.2d 464; Slater Y. Salt Lake Cit~·,
115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153, 9 A.L.R. 2d 712.

to

A unmber of cases haYe helr1 1rnfair Practices Acts
unconstitutional because of exl'mptions grautecl to cer-
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iain persons under the act and because of discrimination
between persons similarly situated. E.g. Kansas v. Consumers Warehouse Market, Inc., 185 Kansas 363, 343
P.2d 234 (1959); Wayne's Distributors, Inc., v. Tilton, 7
N. J. 349, 81 A.2u 786 ( 1951) ; Serr er v. Cigarette Service
Co., 148 Ohio St. 519, 76 N.E.2d 91 (1947). Such discriminations in regard to persons exempted from the act
''1.olate the equal protection and due process clauses of
hoth the federal and state constitutions. An act is unconstitutional if it exempts from its provisions classes
of persons similarly situated to those not exempted in
regard to the purposes of the act. Gronlund v. Salt Lake
City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948); Broadbent v.
Oibson, 105 Utah 55, 140 P.2d 939 (1943).
The Utah Unfair Practices Act creates just such discrimination. The ordinary retailer is prohibited from
srlling below cost except where he endeavors "to meet
the legal price of a competitor.'' A manufacturer or
producer, on the oilier hand, selling exactly the same item
is not so confined. His sales below cost are exempted
under Section l:i-;)-12 ( e) simply by meeting "prices established in interstate competition regardless of cost."
~neh a manufacturer or producer is not limited to meeting "the legal price of a competitor." Thus, a large
manufacturing and retailing organization can sell its
goods iu Utah by simply meding the lo"' prices established in some other state even though that low price is
an ''illegal price.'' The small merchant who is not a
prnducer or mannfacturer ca11110t eYen legally sell at a
lo\\' price to meet his competitor's prices unless that
prier is "legal." -While the lcgislatin~ body has a wide
23

discretion in classifying the types of persons or activities
which come within the purview of a statute, such classification is unconstitutional when the basis upon which it
is fom1ded is unreasonable. rrhere must be a reasonable
basis for the differentiation between the class which is
made subject to the regulation and the class which is not
subject to it, which basis must hear a reasonable relation to the purposes to be accomplished by the act. Slater
v. Salt Lake Cdy, 115 Utah 476, 206 P.2d 153 (1949):
TY allberg v. Utah P'ublic TV cl fare Commission, 115 Utah
242, 20~ P.2d 935 (1949).
The different exemptions granted to a manufacturer
or producer on the one hand and th0 ordinary small retail merchant on the other hand is not only unreasonable
in view of th0 purpose of the act, hut it frustrates the
avowed purpose of the act to promote competition. Section 13-5-17 of the Utah Unfair Practices Act provides
as follows:
The legislature declared that the purpose of
this act is to safeguard the public against the
creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair and discriminatory practices by which fair
and honest competition is destroyed or prevented.
This act shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be subserved.
The broad exemption giv0n to th0 manufacturer-retailer by the act, which is denied to th0 ordinary retail
merchant, gives the competitiYe advantage to the larg(•
manufacturer-ret~ilN in violation of the a,·owed purpose of the act.
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rrhe act also discriminates, without reason or justification, between retailers who receive cash discounts on
the purehase of mcrehandise and those who receive trade
diseounts. In determining the minimum price at which
a refailer may sell his goods the statute permits a retailer
who receives a trade discount to deduct the trade discount from the invoice price. The retailer who receives
a customary cash discount may not deduct this discount
from his invoice price and will thus be required to sell
his goods at a higher price than his competitor who recein•s a trade discount, to avoid violating the law. This
is in spite of the fact that the net costs of the items to
the retailers is identical. What possible reason there can
he for this distinction is unfathomable. As stated by
tlw Utah Supreme Court in Slater v. Salt Lake City,
supra, "If there is a reason for such classification it is
ohscure and appears to us to be more fanciful than real."
rrlie act in treating retailers differently without reason is
unconstitutional mid cannot be upheld. As this court held
in Slater "· Salt Lake City, supra, "If we are unable to
fincl auy reasonable basis for the classification, then we
cm mot sustain the enactment.''

In actual application the act does not treat equally
persons similarly situated. The act purports to prohibit sales helow cost. The statute purportedly permits
a i·etailer to take his invoice price for the goods, deduct
from that price "all trade discounts, except customary
<liscounts for cash," and add to this sum the cost of
freight and cartage plus ''a mark-up to cover a proportionate part of the cost of doing business, which markup, in the absence of proof of a lesser cost shall be 6%
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of the cost to the retailer." The resulting figure is tlw
figure below which the retailer may not sell his merchandise. As pointed out in POINT II, above, the retailer cannot possibly add to the iuYoice cost ''a proportionate part of the cos,t of doing business.'' Such a proportionate part is impossible to ascertain. He is thus
forced to add 6% of the cost as a mark-up. This is presumed to be his cost of doing business and the price below which he is prevented from selling his merchandise.
This formula unjustly discriminates between merchants carrying 011 different types of operations. As an
example, the retailer who operates on a <'ash and carry
basis has less operating expense than the retailer who
operates on a credit and deliYer~· hasis simply because
the former has no collection or d<:'linry expense. Yet if
both merchants purchase their goods from the saml'
source and thereby haYe the same im,oice cost and rPceive the same discounts, the former is unjustly discriminated against insofar as the price at \Yhieh he must sell
is concerned. The cash am] carry merchant is prohibited
from selling his merchandise for less than the eredit and
deliYery merchant, even though his cost of doing business is less. \Vbile the purported purpose of the statute
is to prevent retailers from selling below cost, in nctual
practice the statute operates to set the price of both
merchants regardless of the merchant's actual cost of
doing business to .the detriment of the merchant ha\~ng
the lower operating costs. Such discrimination was condemned in the case of Serrcr \'. Ci,qarette Serricc Co.,
supra. The court stated that although 1Pgis1ative bodies
may, in the exercise of the police power prohibit sales at
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ue1ow cost, legislation enacted to accomplish this object
must be so phrased as to recognize economies a.nd practices whereby one seller can sell particular merchandise
at a lower price than a competitor and still not be
<'harge<l "·ith selling belo>Y actual cost.
The Utah Unfair Practices Act, in giving extensin)
exemption to manufacturer-retailers, which are not availo.hle to the ordinary retailer, in discriminating without
reason between the retailer who receives a trade discount and one who receives a cash discount, and in failing to provide for equal treatment of retailers having
differing overhead operations, is violative of the due
process and equal protection pro,'isions of the federal
and Utah c01rntitutio1rn.

POINT IV
THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT rs
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DUE TO PRESUMPTIONS
WHICH SHIFT 'fHE BURDEN OF PROOF TO
THE DEFENDANT AND-'WHICH UNREASONABLY
ASSUME PROHIBITED ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME TO EXIST FROM FACTS HAVING
NO REASONABLE RELATION THERETO
-While it is generally recognized that the legislature
has the authority to create presumptions from proven
facts, such authority is limited by the due process clauses
of both state and federal constitutions. The due process
clause requires that in a criminal statute the presumption cannot be conclusive, and the fact presumed must be
fairly inferred from the fart prond. Adler v. Board of
Erl11catio11, 342 U.S. 483, 72 S. Ct. 380, 96 L. Ed. 517
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(1952); Great Atlaidic a11d Pacific Tea Co. v. En:iu, 23
F. Supp. 70 (D. l\Iinn. 1938).
The Utah Unfair Practices Act is replete "·ith illegal
presumptions whict do not meet these basic constitutional requirements. Perhaps the most unconstitutional
cf such presumptions is the provision of 13-5-7 which
states that the "cost to the retail('r" shall mean the invoice or replacement cost within 30 days of the dak of
sale, less trade discounts, plus a 6% mark-up to represent the "proportionate part of the cost of doing business." The 6% mark-up is an arbitrary mark-up which
is stated to be the presumed cost of doing business of
every seller, ''in the abs enc(' of proof of a lesser cost.''
A statutory presumption in a criminal statute in order
to be constitutional cannot be a conclusive presumption.
Adler v. Board of Educafio11, supra. A conclusive presumption of the Colorado Uufair Practices Act was
struck down by the Colorado Supreme Court in Perkius
v. King 8001Jers, hie., supra, in which the l'Ourt stated:
The legislative right to declare that the proof
of one fact shall be presumptive or prima facie
evidence of another is no longer open to serious
dispute in this jurisdictiou, or elsewhere. [Citing
cases] It may also he said in the light of the foregoing authorities that the power vestetl in the legislature to create such presumptions is subject to
the qualifif'ation that there must be some rational connection or reasonahle rP la ti on between the
fact 1n·oye<l and the ultimate fact to be established; also such polt'cr is s11b:iect to the further
limitation that f/1e JJrPs11111pfio11 cannot be made a
concl usfre rme.
(emphasis is that of th0 Colorado 8uprcrnc Court.)
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·while the language of the Utah Act indicates that
tlH' presumption of the 6% mark-up is not conclusive,
the presumption is in fact conclusive and any language
in the act to the coutrary is illusory. As pointed out in
POINT II, above, it is impossible for a retailer selling
lrnndn~ds of items of merchandise to allocate to any particular item a proportionate part of his cost of doing
business. The testimony of Dean Randall of the Uni\'ersity of Utah College of Business demonstrates this
impossibility. He pointed out that you can start with
inrnic0 cost lmt must take into consideration trade
<1iscounts or cash discouuts and problems of allocating
these to a particular i·tem available for sale. There are
frc,iµ;ht costs which must likewise he allocated unless the
;-;hipment consists of only one product and the problem
of whether the allocation should he made on the basis
of 1wight or on some other basis. There are also pur<'hasing costs to take into account, such as writing the
on1Prs, checking the orders and mailing and the time requircLl of the person making the order. In regard to
tl1e latter, this hccomes n1y difficult ·where the order
elcrk is purchasing thousands of items and in irregular
rnlumc•. Storage must be allocated on an arhitrary basis
and ont> of the factors to he considered is the time the
particular article is stored and the space i11Yolnd for
stornge. Transportation from the warehouse or storage
<Ut•a is a11 ml<litional cost factor. Ad1,ertising costs can
oeeasiomtlly he allocated if, for example, nothing but
Bay('l' Aspirin was ach'crtisecl on a certain day for sale
i11 n particular store, hut where many products are sold
;1]](] a large shopping area is iiffolncl the allocation of
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cost of advertising to a particnla r item is "t=>xtrem<'rly
difficult.'' Dean Randall further testified that under
both the Skaggs and Grand Central accounting systems,
both of which he thought were proper accounting systems
enn though different, it would not be proper to allocate an accurate cost to a specific item. Finally Dean
Randall concluded as follows :
In my opinion in a. retail store handling thousands of items it would he economically . impossible to arrive at a realistic cost of s<'lling each
item. (R 116)
Since it is impossible for m1~v retailer to prove hil'
''proportionate part of the cost of doing business'' attributable to an item of merchandisf', the arbitrary prrsumption that it is 6% of cost becomes a conclusive presumptio11. The creation of this conclusive presumption
is unconstitutional.
This conclusive presumption with regard to cost, i~
fortified by an administrative presumption with regard
to the intent factor. The <:'xecuti,·e secretary of the Trade
Commission testified (H. 124) that the statutory requin'ment of intent to i11jure a competitor, etc., is taken for
granted when he firnls a sa]e belO\\' the "legal price." rrhe
result would be e11forceme11t action aud the burden
thrown on the defrrnlnnt to prow that he did not intend
to mJure a compditor ancl so forth.
The Utah Act nlso creates a presumption in
13-:'5-9(2) that proof of th!' limitation of the quantity to
be sold to any one customer couplc•d with a showing that
the product was ~:old hclow cost ns <10fi11ed by the act,
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creates a presumption that the sale was made for the
purpose of destroying competition or injuring a competitor. Count IV of plaintiff's complaint alleged that
on or about June 20, 1966, the defendant Skaggs advertisrd Polaroid Swinger Cameras for sale at $13.49, which
was less than cost as defined by the act and limited the
purchase of the cameras to one (1) to a customer which
was less than the entire supply owned or possessed by
Skaggs. The plaintiff relied upon the presumption contained in 13-5-9 (2) to establish that the purpose of the sale
\1·as to destroy competition or otherwise injure a competitor. Except for this presumption the trial court
found that there ·was insufficient evidence to justify a
finding that Skaggs offered the item for sale for any
purpose proscribed by the statute.
Such a presumption of illegal intent in an Unfair
Practices Act has been struck down in several cases from
dht.•r jurisdictions. E.g. Motts Super Markets, Inc. v.
Transinelli, 148 Conn. 481, 172 A.2d 381 (1961); W. M.
Wiley v. Samson-Ripley Co., 131 Maine 400, 120 A.2d 289
(1%6)); Perkins v. King 8oopers, Inc., supra. In order
for any presumption to be constitutional the fact pre:':lnme<l must be fairly inferred from the fact proven. Tot
Y. United ,'-Uates, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S. Ct. 1241, 87 L. Ed.
1319 (1943); Adler v. Board of Education, supra. The
court in (ireat Atlantic and Pacifi,c Tea Co. v. Ervin,
s11pra, stated iu holding the presumption provision of an
Unfair Practices .Act to be unconstitutional:
It is apparent from this decision of the Supreme Court that in cletermiui~g tl:e validity of
a presumption rreated hy a legislative body, two
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questions a re to he coll side reel: ( 1) Whether thr
fact presnmecl may be fairly inferred from the
fact proven: (2) \Vlwther the presumption created will be of aid to the state without subjecting
th0 accused to nureaso11ahle hardship or oppression. With respect to tlw pr0sumption cn'ated hr
the sixth paragraph of section ~1 of part 2, we ha,-~
already pointed out that in our opinion the fact
of guilty intent is not reasonablv to he iJlfcrred
from th~ fact of sale at less tlia1; 10% ahon~ the
cost of the goods. No doubt, the presumption of
g-nilt would be helpful to the state in prosecution
of alleged violators of the statut0, hut it would he
as hurtful to the accused as it wonld be helpful
to the accuser. Intent is somethil1g which is 0asily
asserted al\Cl hard to dispron~. To cast upon a
merchant who has sold goo(ls at less than 10/c
abo,-e th(• rost, the bnrde11 of C'stal)lishing that
the sale was not made with an intent to injure
competitors or destroy competition, suhjects him
to unreason a hie hardship. ·we think the disadvantage to him of tlw presnmption of guilt should
he regarded as ouhH•ighing tlw advantage of thr
presumption to the state.
The limitafom on the <)mlllf i1.Y of it0ms which a retailer permits 011e customer to purchase has 110 hearing
\Vhatsoever upon liis intention in se1liug that particular
item below cost as definNl in the act. 1\fr. Edwin Austin.
Supervis0r of Skctggs' stor0s in the Salt Lake area, testified in this case that tlie reasons wh>' a retailer limits
the number of items which ma>' be pmcliased by one custom0r are varictl, Hone of which are the injury of a competitor or the lessening of competition. The nwnl>er of
items which could Le pnrchas0d Ji~- one customer may ]JL'
rcistrict0d due to tlw fact that thC' retailer has a limited
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.'-'npply of that particular item and \\'ishes to supply as
many of his customers with the item as possible, or the
1111mber of it<:>ms whieh 0110 eustomer may purehase may
he restricted to prcYent a raid on the retailer's supply of
that lrnrticular item hy a eompetitor, or the retailer's
supply of that particular item may be restricted by the
supplier. The testimony of 1\Ir. A us tin in this connection
is a:-; follows (R. 88-90):
Q. Now, with respect to Count V of the - exense me, Count VI of the eomplaint, this relates
to the sale of Polaroid Swinger Cameras at $13.49.
At the time that was sold it is alleged and admitted that we limited the purchase of cameras to
one per customrr. Can you tell the Court ·why
tl1at limitdion was imposed?

A. \VPll, this was ai1 opening in our new store
O\'<:>r on Eighth \\Tpst, arnl all openings, wr like to
gi \·e our eustomers something unusual, well, probably to gin• thrm some reason to come in and look
at om new store. The reason that this Polaroid
Camera \\'ClS limited, Polaroid Cameras at that
tirn(' "·ere on alloeation. \Ve felt \Ye had enough
rnmeras in this particular market, thi8 Eighth
\Y rst Store, proYiding they did not come in and
try to buy all of them up, hrn or three per bill.
A11other thing, in Polaroid Cameras we usually
focl wr are limited. \Ve usually frel \\Te do not give
the customer :10 days' supply in a camera. No
om' customrr needs more than one camera, and we
frlt we were justified in limiting it to one camera
pt>r family so Wl' could supply all our eustomers
111 that arc11.
Q. You used the term, the cameras were in
allocation.
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A. When Polaroid comes out with new modr\.-.;
they will quite often allocat._ • their supply an!l you
are limited to so many in one Rtore. All of P~la
roid 's accounts through tlw country would lw allocated. \Vhatever you are set up for that store,
that is all you could buy. You can't buy all vou
want of tlw Polaroid Cam0ras.
·
·
Q. (By ~Ir. \Valdo) Referring hack to the
Swinger Camera now again, it is one item from
time to time that in your general merchandising
you find necessary to limit in quantity, is that
correct?
A. Occasionally.
Q. Now, is it possible when yon ha \'e made u
attractive prie0 on an it0m for C'\'en
one of your com1wtitors to come in and hny large
quantities of that item'!
A. This sometimes happens.
particularl~y

Q. And so it is fair to sa~v that at least on
a reason for limiting quantity is to protect from this kind of competitiYe raid?
A. Yes.
o~casions

It is clear from the uncontraclicted testimony of 1\Ir. Austin and from a reasoned examination of the presumption
that there exists no logical conneetion between the fad
that the retail0r has· limited the number of item:;; which
ran be purehased b)· on0 customer arnl tlw fact to he
presumed therefrom, that tlw retailer has the intent to
injUl'9 01' destrO)' competition. rJ1lH' presumption i~
nnconsti tut iona I.
The lTtah Act also en•ates wlrnt nppenrs to he an
irrelrnttnhle pre:;;umption of the guilt of an officer or
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agent of a corporation being prosecuted under the act
by proof of "the unlawful intent of the person, firm or
corporation for whom or for which he acts.'' This presumption is created by Section 13-5-11 of the act. Such
a presumption is clearly a violation of the due process
<·lanses of the state and federal constitutions. An identirnl provision of the Unfair Practices Act was held unconstitutional in Great Atla,ntic and Pacific Tea Co., v.
Erci11, supra. The court in that case stated:
To visit the sins of the guilty upon the innocent, to impute a wrongful intent to those who
have none, to make guilt depend upon a legislative fiat, ought not to be tolerated under our system of criminal jurisprudence.
'rl1e irrebuttable presumption as to what a retailer's
prop01·tionate cost of doing business is and the presumptions of illegal intent from the existence of facts not related thereto make the act violate the due process clauses
of the federal and state constitutions a.ml render the act
unconstitutional.
POINT V.
THE UTAH UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRICE FIXING STATUTE
SincP, as pointed out aboYe, it is impossible for a
retailer to add to an item which he sells the proportionatC' part of the retailer's cost of doing business, the retailer is n•quired to add to his invoice price a charge of
(i'1 ~'. ']~his is the price below ~which he cannot legally sell
11is g·oocls. His failure to make such a mark-up subjects
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him to the penalties of the criminal law reg-anlless of
whether such act by the merchant tends to deceive a purchaser, lessens competition, unreasonablv restrains trade
or tends to create a monopoly. He is declared to be in
violation of the act regardless of >Yl1ether or 11ot his intent in selling the goods at below the required mark-up
was with the inte11t of accomplishiug· any of these effects. But the most sinister aspect of this price-fixing
statute is that in many instances the 6o/r mark-up which a
retailer is required to make is not related to the price at
which he purchased his merchandise, hut to tlw price at
which his competitors may, at that time, purchase the
same items. The ::-;tatute specifically prO"\Tides that if a
retailer purchases merchandise aml does i10t sell all of
that merchandise 'Yithin a period of 30 days it is not that
retailer's invoice cost, but the replacement cost of the
goods to which the 6% mark-up must be added. Thus, a
merchant ·who makes an advantageous purchase of goods
at a low price and who still has some or all of the goods
on hand 30 days after his purchase cannot sell the good~
to his customers at a reasonable mark-up which ·would
have the effect of both furnishing him with a profit and
passing pal"t of the savings incurred through his advaHtageous purchase on to the consumer. In order to avoicl
violating t!1e law, he must price his goods for an amount
whieh will, in effect, not be below the price at which his
comp2titorn can then purcha::-;e the goods at the higher
invoice price and then sell them at a 67o mark-up.
If legislati,,e price fixi11g of this sort en11 be justificcl.
aud of course, we contend it can never he justified, it is
certainly not justified in onler to protect the "small''
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mer(']wnt from !lie "largt~" merchaut as appellants
\\·ould han' the <'Ourt believe. In this day of cooperati\·e lniyi11g thrnugh large organizations such as Assoeiat('d Urneers, both small and large are able to compete with one another on much the same hasis. Appellant 's O\Vll witness, I\rr. Sorenson, testified they could buy
as well as any of the chai11 stores (R. 147-148). Compei itio11 is the lifo-1Jloocl of trade and freedom in fixing
prirt>s is funclam011tal to free competition.
This same type of statute was held to be unconstitutiowd by the \Vest Virginia Supreme Court in the case
of State Y. Wender, supra. The statute in question in that
<·nse n•quirPd tlw dcfemlant to make computations con< ernillµ; '' rnst of doing lmsiJ1ess. '' The court found this
as wl'll as other IJJ'O\·isions to be incomprehensible and,
siucp the rdailel' could not understand it, he was required
to rel.Y upon the l'cgulations imposed by the statute. This
nmo1lll ted to price fixing aml was held by the court to
IJP m1co11st i tutional.
'!'he lT tali Supreme Court has always carefully scru1i nizt•d legislation ·which smacks of price fixing and if
prie~ fixing is found has condemned the statute or activity n:.; l1ei11g in Yiolatiou of Artirle XII, Section 20 of
the l'tah ( 'onstitutiou. Thus, in Gammon Y. Federated
Jfilk l'rod111'el's A:-:sociation, Inc., 11 U. 2cl 421, 360 P.2d
1018 (1961) the Utah Supr0me Court struck clown as
lllH·o11stitut.ional price fixing, a contract entered into by
;i eoop<>rntin' under the Uniform Agrieultural Cooperatin' .Ad, which set minimum prices for the sale of milk.
In (;,.11eral Electric Compa11y v. Thrifty Sales, 5 U.2cl
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326, 301 P.2d i41 (1956) the Utah Supreme Court declared the Utah Fair Trade Act unconstitutional as a
price fixing statute. In the course of the opinion, Justice Crockett made the following observations which
apply just as strongly to the Unfair Practices Act.
Regardless of whatever forms or rituals are
gone through to accomplish the purpose of establishing retailers prices, or of any conjecture about
the purpose of the legislation, the indisputable
fact is that insofar as the non-signing merchant
and the public are concerned, the act so operates
that the agreement of the manufacturer and one
dealer does establish the price at which the manufacturer's product must be sold by all retailers
within the area. Therefore, in its basic essence, it
must he rrgarded as ''price fixing'' and for that
reason the act is invalid under Section 20, Article
XII of our Constitution.
In Pride Oil Company v. Salt Lake County, 13 U.2d
183, 370 P .2d 355 ( 1962), this court declared unconstitutional a statute which regulated the posting of gasoline
prices by service stations. The ostensible purpose of the
statute was to protect the public by preventing false and
misleading advertising. The court had no difficulty in
seeing through the avowed purpose of the statute to its
real purpose, however, which was the control of gasoline
prices and th~ elimination of gas wars, and the entire
statute was declared unconstitutional.
In Rez:ne v. Trade Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192
P.2d 563 (1948) this court declared the Barbers' Price
and Hour Act to be unconstitutional. The stated purpose of the act was to protect the public by establishing
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minimum standards for barber shops. In effect, the act
established minimum prices. The language of Justice
Latimcr's concurring opinion at page 575 is apropos in
this case:
It is most difficult to believe the intent of this
act is to protect the health and welfare of the public. This has already been protected. \Vhen the
mask is cast aside, we see the familiar act, which
is claimed to be altruistic in principle, but is
nothing more than a legislative permit to increase
the cost of the service to the public. It substitutes
the will of the profession for the will of the legislature and stifles individual initiative and energy
·when it is unnecessary to do so to protect the
public good. It may increase the income of some
of the individual shop owners, but this has no reasonable relationship to the public health and
welfare.
The appellants contend that the Utah Unfair Practices Act is not a price-fixing statute since it merely establishes minimum prices. This argument was laid to
rest in Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Association, Inc., supra. That was all the contract involved in
that case did. The Utah Supreme Court in declaring
!he contract unconstitutional held, however,
Upon the basis of the record presented here it
appears that the defendant acting under the provisions of the agreement with its members has engag0d in fixing the minimum price for which
milk \ms sold to distributors and processors, and
iu doing so its conduct has come within the prohibitions of Article XII, Section 20 of our Constitution.
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POIXT YI.
THE GIVIKG A\YA Y OF AX ITE~I OF
MERCHANDISE IN COXKECTION \VITH A SALE
IS XOT PROHIBITED BY THE
lTTAH rxF AIR PRACTICES ~\CT
The lower court found in connection with Count III
of plaintiff's complaint that on June 20, 1966, Skaggs ad,-ertised cartons of cigarettes for $2.73 and gaYe a cigarette lighter away free with each purchase of a carton,
which cigarette lighter eost Skaggs 2.3¢ each. The sail·
of the carton of cigarettes alone was not a sale belo"cost &s defined by the act, but the combined articles, cigarettes and lighter, if taken together and considered a single snle, was a sale below cost as defined by the act. (R.
39) The court concluded that the sale by Skaggs of eigarettes and the gift of a cigarette lighter \\·ith a carton of
cigarettes did not ,-iolate the aet because the sale of the
cigarettes alone was not a sale below cost as defined by
the act and the 1'6ft of the c-igarettt• lightc>r \\·as not prohibited by the act. (R. 46)
Prior to the 1965 amendment of the act the first sentence of Section 13-5-9 of the act rea<l as follows:
For the purpose of preYenting eYasion of the
1n·o\isions of this act in all sales im·olYing mo_rr
than one item or commodity a11d in all salPs lllrolri11g tlzP giri119 of any ro11cpssio11 of any h:iud
1clwtsoerer ( wlietl1l'r it br coupons or othenc1sc)
the Yendor's or distributor's selling price slrnll
not be below the cost of all articles, products, commodities, a11d co11cessio11s included in such tran~
actions.
-1:0

ThP emphasized portions of the act which preeluded
t!Jl' giYiug away uf ih'ms were deleted hy the 1965 legis-

lature, and the act as it no\\' reads does not prohibit give;11rnys. In each of the following cases the comis han
held that Fnfair Practices Acts do not prohibit the giving- away of items in connection with sales unless the act
in (1uestio11 specifically prohibits such action. State Ex
!ns. Heath Y. Ta11ker Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218, 26 N"."\\.2cl

1q.7

C11ited Retail Orocers Assor·iatin11 "· Harrison & Sons, I11c., 89 Pa. D & C 294 (1954); State of
.lf i1111r.-:ota Y. ~1ppleba11ms Food Jlarket, Inc., 259 :\Iinn.
~fl'.l, JO(; X."\Y. 2d 896 (1960).
(1~141):

COXCLT'SIOX
The lTtah rnfair Practices ~'1et lS an arbitrar>· and
mll'easona hle exercise of the police power, which is so
tm(·on~;titntionally Yagne that those subject to its proYi:-;i(111:-; ('amwt determine \Yhat the:-- may or may not do in
1mler to ffrnid committing a crime. It is an act which
nn.iustifia bl:-- discrimi1iates lwtween persons similarly sitnatt>d and im1n·o1wrl:- creates presumptions of g-uilt
<llHl is, in <>ffect, Eotl1ing more than a price-fi.."\:ing statut1'. Tl1t' retail<>r subject to the act is Yictimized for his
forl'si~ht i11 making early, acl,-antageous purchases of his
n1Pr("brndisl', b:-- ht·ing required to sell his goods at a
pric-1· in excess of G'. ~ of the price at which his less astute
1·1·m1ictitor can tlwn purehase the same merchandise. His
i'ailme to tlo so subjects him to criminal punishment
!,a'l'•l npou irrelmttal1]p arnl illog·ical presumptions of
~nilt. The amhiguitiC'" ,,·hich permeatt.' the -.;tatute re-

quire him to constantly guess as to what he may or may
not do in seHing his prices, even when all he is attempting to do is to meet the prices of his competitors.
Yet, penalized as he is by this legislation, the retailer is not the principal victim. The one who actually
pays the price for this price-fixing sfatute is the consumer. It is he who pays the higher prices for merchandise because of the act's stifling of competition in the
retail market.
Respectfully submitted,
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